Introduction
If a country is unable to borrow abroad in its own currency -if it suffers from the problem that we refer to as "original sin" -then when it accumulates a net debt, as developing countries are expected to do, it will have an aggregate currency mismatch on its balance sheet. Of course, such a country can take various steps to eliminate that mismatch or prevent it from arising in the first place. Most obviously, it can decide not to borrow. A financially autarchic country will have no currency mismatch because it has no external debt, even though it still suffers from original sin as we define it. But this response clearly has costs; the country in question will forgo all the benefits, in the form of additional investment finance and consumption smoothing, offered by borrowing abroad. Alternatively, the government can accumulate foreign reserves to match its foreign obligations. In this case the country eliminates its currency mismatch by eliminating its net debt (matching its foreign currency borrowing with foreign currency reserves). But this too is costly: the yield on reserves is generally significantly below the opportunity cost of funds.
All of this might seem relatively inconsequential. The currency denomination of the foreign debt has not, until recently, figured prominently in theories of economic growth and cyclical fluctuations. Macroeconomic stability, according to the conventional wisdom, reflects the stability and prudence of a country's monetary and fiscal policies.
The rate of growth of per capita incomes depends on rates of human and physical capital accumulation and on the adequacy of the institutional arrangements determining how that capital is deployed. Fine points like the currency in which a country's foreign debt is denominated, by comparison, are regarded as specialized concerns of interest primarily to financial engineers.
In this chapter we show that neglect of this problem constitutes an important oversight. In particular, we show that the composition of external debt -and specifically the extent to which that debt is denominated in foreign currency -is a key determinant of the stability of output, the volatility of capital flows, the management of exchange rates, and the level of country credit ratings. We present empirical analysis demonstrating that this 'original sin' problem has statistically significant and economically important implications, even after controlling for other conventional determinants of macroeconomic outcomes. We show that the macroeconomic policies on which growth and cyclical stability depend, according to the conventional wisdom, are themselves importantly shaped by the denomination of countries' external debts.
Establishing the importance of original sin for the macroeconomic outcomes of interest requires a precise measure of the phenomenon. Indeed, one reason why the problem of debt denomination has not received the attention it deserves may be that adequate information on its incidence and extent are not readily available. Thus, a contribution of this chapter is to develop a series of numerical indicators of original sin.
In addition to demonstrating their importance for the macroeconomic variables relevant to our argument, we present the indicators themselves, country by country, so they can be used by other authors to analyze still other problems.
In Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, we quantify the problem and characterize its incidence. Section 4 analyzes its effects -what we characterize as the pain of original sin. This is followed by a brief conclusion and an appendix where we report the results of a battery of sensitivity analyses and present the underlying indicators.
Facts about Original Sin
Of the nearly $5.8 trillion in outstanding securities placed in international markets in the period 1999-2001, $5.6 trillion was issued in 5 major currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound sterling and Swiss franc. To be sure, the residents of the countries issuing these currencies (in the case of Euroland, of the group of countries) constitute a significant portion of the world economy and hence form a significant part of global debt issuance. But while residents of these countries issued $4.5 trillion dollars of debt over this period, the remaining $1.1 trillion of debt denominated in their currencies was issued by residents of other countries and by international organizations. Since these other countries and international organizations issued a total of $1.3 trillion dollars of debt, it follows that they issued the vast majority of it in foreign currency. The measurement and consequences of this concentration of debt denomination in few currencies is the focus of this paper. We split the sample into two periods, demarcated by the introduction of the euro. The figures are the average stock of debt outstanding during in each sub-period. The information is organized by country groups and currencies of denomination. The first country group, financial centers, is composed of the US, the UK, Japan, and Switzerland; the second is composed of the Euroland countries; the third contains the remaining developed countries; and the fourth is made up of the developing countries; we also report data on bond issues by the international financial institutions (since these turn out to be important below).
Column 1 presents the amount of average total stock of debt outstanding issued by residents of these country groups. Column 2 shows the corresponding percentage composition by country group. Columns 3 and 4 do the same for debt issued by residents in their own currency, while columns 5 and 6 look at the total debt issued by currency, independent of the residence of the issuer. Column 7 is the proportion of the debt that the residents of each country group issued in their own currency (the ratio of column 3 to column 1), while column 8 is the proportion of total debt issued in a currency relative to the debt issued by residents of those countries (the ratio of column 5 to column 1).
Notice that while the major financial centers issued only 34 percent of the total debt outstanding in 1993-1998, debt denominated in their currencies amounted to 68 percent of that total. In contrast, while other developed countries ex-Euroland issued fully 14 percent of total world debt, less than 5 percent of debt issued in the world was denominated in their own currencies. Interestingly, in the period 1999-2001 -following the introduction of the euro -the share of debt denominated in the currencies of other developed countries declined to 1.6 percent. Developing countries accounted for 10 percent of the debt but less than one per cent of the currency denomination in the 1993-1998 period. This, in a nutshell, is the problem of original sin.
When we look at the currency denomination of the debt issued by residents, we see that residents of the major financial centers chose to denominate 68.3 percent of it in their own currency in 1999-2001, while the residents of Euroland used the euro in 56.8 percent of their cross-border bond placements. This figure is substantially higher than the 23.2 percent which they chose to denominate in their own currency in 1993-1998, before the introduction of the euro. In that earlier period, the other developed countries issued 17.6 percent of their debt in their own currencies, a number not too different from that for the Euroland countries; in the recent period, however, this number has declined to 9.6 percent. The number for developing countries is an even lower 2.7 percent.
It is sometimes possible for countries to borrow in one currency and swap their obligations into another. Doing so requires, however, that someone actually issue debt in the domestic currency (otherwise there is nothing to swap). Column 8 takes this point on board and is therefore a better measure of a country's ability to borrow abroad in its own currency than column 7, in the sense that when the ratio in column 8 is less than 1, it indicates that there are not enough bonds to do the swaps needed to hedge the foreign currency exposure of residents.
Column 8 reveals that in 1999-2001 the ratio of debt in the currencies of the major financial centers to debt issued by their residents was more than 150 per cent.
(This, in a sense, is what qualifies them as financial centers.) This ratio drops to 91.3 percent for the Euroland countries, to 18.8 percent in the other developed countries (down from 32.9 percent in the previous period), and to 10.9 percent for the developing nations. Notice that after the introduction of the euro, Euroland countries narrow their gap with the major financial centers while other developed countries converge towards the ratios exhibited by developing nations. Figure 1 plots the cumulative share of total debt instruments issued in the main currencies (the solid line) and the cumulative share of debt instruments issued by the largest issuers (the dotted line). The gap between the two lines is striking. While 87 percent of debt instruments are issued in the 3 main currencies (the US dollar, the euro and the yen), residents of these three countries issue only 71 percent of total debt instruments. The corresponding figures for the top five currencies, 97 and 83 percent, respectively, tell the same story. Table 2 presents similar information for cross-border claims by international banks reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. These data only distinguish the five major currencies (US dollar, euro, Swiss franc, British pound, and Japanese yen) and an "other currency" category. The table shows that of $7.8 trillion in cross-border bank claims, 81 percent are denominated in the 5 major currencies. While we cannot know how much is actually issued in each borrower's currency, we can safely say that the bulk of the debt in the developing world and in the developed countries outside the issuers of the major currencies is also in foreign currency.
One possible problem with the data of Table 1 is that it only captures cross-border bond issuance and does not capture the nationality of the bondholder, only the place of issue. So, it may be the case that countries do their local currency funding in the local market and their foreign currency funding abroad. Foreigners willing to hold domestic currency bonds would just purchase them in the local markets. These domestically issued but foreign owned domestic currency bonds would not be included in Table 1 . To address this issue we look at the currency composition of the international securities held by US residents, independently of the place of issue.
According to the US Treasury (Table 3) , these securities amounted to USD 647 billion at the end of 2001. However, of these securities USD 456 billion or 70.4 percent were denominated in US dollars. This indicates that the willingness of US investors to expose themselves to foreign credit risk is significantly higher than their willingness to expose themselves to foreign currency risk: they hold more claims on foreigners than claims in foreign currency. Moreover, if we include the exposure to the euro, the yen and the British pound and the Canadian dollar, the total foreign exposure of US investors denominated in major currencies amounts to 97 percent of the total. In the case of developing countries, while US investors held USD 84 billion in securities issued by developing countries, only 2.6 billion (or 3.1 percent) was denominated in local currency.
The message of Table 3 is similar to that of Table 1 : global investors denominate their claims predominantly in very few currencies. The willingness to hold foreign securities is significantly larger than the willingness to hold them in foreign currency, except for a few major currencies.
All this points to the fact that original sin is a global phenomenon. It is not limited to a small number of problem countries. It seems to be associated with the fact that the vast majority of the world's financial claims are denominated in a small set of currencies. In turn this suggests that the problem may have something to do with observed patterns of portfolio diversification -or its absence. We develop this point in Chapter 9.
Measuring Original Sin
To develop indices of original sin, we use the data on securities and bank claims used to construct Tables 1 and 2. We start with the securities data set, which provides a full currency breakdown.
Our first indicator of original sin (OSIN1) is one minus the ratio of the stock of international securities issued by a country in its own currency to the total stock of international securities issued by the country. Thus, a country that issues all its securities in own currency would get a zero, while a country that issues all of them in foreign currency would get a 1 (the higher the value, the greater the sin). We also compute a variant of OSIN1 by using the data on security holding by US investors (USSIN1).
OSIN1 has two drawbacks. First, it only covers securities and not other debts.
Second, it does not take account of opportunities for hedging currency exposures through swaps. We deal with these issues next. Consider the following ratio: in fact does for countries such as the US and Switzerland, since there is more debt issued in their currency than debt issued by nationals. However, these countries cannot hedge more than the debt they have. Hence, they derive scant additional benefits from having excess opportunities to hedge. We therefore substitute zeros for all negative numbers, producing our third index of original sin: We are now in a position to refine INDEXA. Recall that INDEXA understates original sin by assuming that all debt that is not in the 5 major currencies is denominated in local currency. This may be a better approximation for countries with some capacity to issue debt in their own currencies. However, if this is so, it should be reflected in OSIN3 because it means that someone -either a resident or a foreign entity -might have been able to float a bond denominated in that currency. If this is not the case, this provides information about the likelihood that the bank loans not issued in the 5 major currencies, were denominated in some other foreign currency. We therefore replace the value of INDEXA by that of OSIN3 in those cases where the latter is greater than the former.
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Hence we propose to measure OSIN2 as:
Notice that OSIN2 ≥ OSIN3 by construction and that, in most cases, OSIN1 ≥ Table A1 .) As before, we observe the lowest numbers for the major financial centers, followed by Euroland countries (which exhibit a major reduction in original sin after the introduction of the euro). Other developed countries exhibit higher values, while the highest values are for the developing world (Figure 2 ). The lowest values in the developing world are in Eastern Europe, while the highest are in Latin America.
OSIN2.
Original sin from the perspective of US investors (USSIN1) is similar to the one we observe with the BIS data. There is a strong positive correlation between USSIN1 and each of OSIN1 (0.64, p-value 0.00) and OSIN3 (0.50, p-value 0.00). As in the case, of OSIN3, the developing countries with the lowest values of USSIN1 (below 0.9) are South Africa, Czech Republic, Poland, and Taiwan (Hungary has a low value in USSIN1 but a higher values in OSIN3). Table 5 3 In fact, the countries listed in Table 5 are equally distributed among fixers, floaters and countries with an intermediate regime ( Figure 3 ).
Original sin is also persistent, to a surprising extent. Flandreau and Sussman in
Chapter 6 below present a three-way classification of original sin circa 1850, based on whether countries placed bonds in local currency, indexed their debt to gold (included gold clauses in their debts), or did some of both. clauses in the 1850s suffer from significantly higher levels of original sin today than either countries that issued both gold-indexed and domestic-currency debt (p-value = 0.016) or those that issued exclusively in local currency (p-value = 0.000).
In their original formulation, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) defined original sin as "a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad, or to borrow long term, even domestically [emphasis added]. While the focus of this book and this chapter is the inability to borrow abroad in domestic currency (what we call international original sin), we also computed an index for the capacity of a country to borrow at long maturities domestically (which we refer to as domestic original sin). There are two reasons for deriving such an index. First of all, it would be important to know to what extent these two issues are related or are in fact two different types of issues.
Second, it has been argued that creating a domestic market in own currency is a necessary condition for inducing foreigners to use a country's currency (Tirole, 2002) . We would like to shed some light on these issues both here and in Chapter 9.
Our main source of information is J.P. Morgan's (2002 Morgan's ( , 2000 Morgan's ( , 1998 Our definition of domestic original sin focuses on both foreign currency debt and domestic currency short-term debt (or long-term but floating so that it has very little duration risk). It should be clear that while the definition focuses on total debt, we only have information on traded debt (and mostly public debt). Hence, our index does not include information on bank loans. Table 7 ranks countries according to the domestic original sin index. We find that more than half of the countries in our sample have indexes that are above 50 percent. Only 5 out of the 22 countries of Table 7 have more than three-quarters of their public debt in long-term fixed rate domestic currency bonds. there are no countries that can borrow abroad in local currency, but have small long-term fixed-rate domestic markets. This suggests that domestic market development is a necessary condition for redemption from original sin. However, the graph also shows that it is not a sufficient condition: while there are 8 countries that suffers from both types of sin (second quadrant) and 6 countries have achieved redemption in both dimensions (fourth quadrant), 7 countries suffer from international original sin, while having been redeemed on the domestic front (third quadrant).
5 In Chapter 9 we discuss the causes of this pattern and the unconventional role played by capital controls 6 .
The Pain
Original sin has important consequences. Countries with original sin that have net foreign debt will have a currency mismatch on their national balance sheets. Movements in the real exchange rate will then have aggregate wealth effects. 7 This makes the real exchange rate a relevant price in determining the capacity to pay. Since the real exchange rate is quite volatile and it tends to depreciate in bad times, original sin significantly lowers the creditworthiness of a country. Moreover, the wealth effects limit the effectiveness of monetary policy, as expansionary policies may weaken the exchange rate, cause a reduction in net worth and will thus be either less expansionary or even contractionary (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee 2001, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco in Chapter 2 of this volume). This renders central banks less willing to let the exchange rate move, and they respond by holding more reserves and aggressively intervening in the foreign exchange market or adjusting short-term interest rates Stein, 2001, Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . The existence of dollar liabilities also limits the ability of central banks to avert liquidity crises in their role as lenders of last resort (Chang and Velasco, 2000) . And, dollar-denominated debts and the associated volatility of domestic interest rates heighten the uncertainty associated with public debt service, thus lowering credit ratings.
Given these facts, it is no surprise that countries afflicted by original sin have a hard time achieving domestic economic stability. Their incomes are more variable and their capital flows more volatile than those of countries free of the phenomenon. Since financial markets know that inability to borrow abroad in the domestic currency is a source of financial fragility, developing countries burdened with original sin are charged an additional risk premium when they borrow, forcing them to skate closer to the edge of solvency. A shock to the exchange rate can then cause asset prices to move adversely, tipping them over the precipice. But if countries attempt instead to minimize these risks by limiting their recourse to foreign sources of funding, they may then be starved of the finance needed to underwrite their growth. The process of economic and financial development will be slowed. Countries in this situation thus face a Hobson's choice.
Original sin and fiscal solvency
It has been amply recognized that developing countries tend to be more volatile than industrial countries in the sense that they have a more unstable rate of GDP growth (IDB, 1995, Hausmann and Gavin 1996) . Table 8 shows that their GDP growth is more than twice as volatile as that of industrial countries: 5.8 percent per annum instead of 2.7.
However, if a country's debt is denominated in foreign currency -say US dollars -its capacity to pay will be related, not to the value of its GDP in constant local currency units (LCU), but in US dollar terms. Table 8 shows that the volatility of changes in real US$ GDP is almost 3 times higher than in LCU for developing countries. Hence, the typical industrial country without original sin would face a relevant volatility of 2.7 percent per annum, while the typical developing country with original sin would face a relevant volatility of 13 percent.
The greater relevant volatility in the capacity to pay comes from the fact that original sin makes the real exchange rate matter for debt service and this variable is very volatile in developing countries. Table 9 presents the volatility of the real exchange rate for a sample of developed and developing countries. The volatilities are normalized to be equal to 1 for the sample as a whole. The table clearly shows that the volatility of the real exchange rate is between 2 and 3 times higher in developing countries. Hence, not only does the real exchange rate matter for debt service in countries with original sin, but in addition, the real exchange rate in these countries tends to be significantly more volatile.
Analysts often argue that a volatile real exchange rate does not matter if the debt is sufficiently long term. If purchasing power parity holds in the long run, then deviations of the real exchange rate should not be very long-lived and a country's solvency should not be much affected by relatively temporary movements in the real exchange rate.
Markets will not change their minds about the solvency of a country based on short term movements of the real exchange rate. However, the 5-year average value of the debt to GDP ratio would have moved by more than 50 percent in the typical developing countries through real exchange rate valuation changes alone! Table 9 shows that the greater volatility of the real exchange rate in developing countries is as much of a feature at 5 years than at 1 year and that it has remain the same in the 1980s and 1990s.
Another way to look at this data is by studying the events in which there has been a large decline in the capacity to pay foreign debt. Table 10 shows the occasions in which the dollar value of GDP over a two-year period fell by more than 30 percent 9 . Two facts clearly emerge from the table: the events identified tend to capture many of the recent debt crises. More importantly, while the average decline in dollar GDP for this sample of countries was 46 percent, the decline in GDP in local currency units was less than a twentieth of that. The collapse in the capacity to pay is more related to real exchange rate movements than to output declines.
One implication of this analysis is that countries suffering from original sin should be significantly riskier than countries without this burden, after controlling for other determinants of creditworthiness such as debt ratios. This may help explain the poor predictive capacity of fiscal fundamentals such as the debt to tax revenue ratio as a determinant of credit rating, as is clear from Figure 5 . 10 Countries like Brazil, Argentina, Turkey and Mexico had a debt to tax ratio that was broadly similar or in fact lower than those of the Italy, Belgium, the US, Canada or Spain while their credit rating could not be more different. 11 As argued in Hausmann (2003) , original sin lowers evaluations of solvency because it heightens the dependence of debt service on the evolution of the exchange rate, which is more volatile and may be subject to crises and crashes.
To test this hypothesis, we regress foreign-currency credit rating of countries on two standard measures of fiscal fundamentals --public debt as a share of GDP and public debt as a share of tax revenues--on the level of development, on the magnitude of the foreign debt (SHARE) and on original sin. The equations are estimated by weighted double-censored Tobit. The results, in Table 11 , show a large and statistically significant effect of original sin on credit ratings. 12 Redemption (the total elimination of original sin)
is associated with an improvement of ratings by about five notches. This effect is strong and present even though we control for the level of economic development, as captured by the real GDP per capita and for the magnitude of the public debt measured either as a share of GDP or as a share of tax revenues.
Hence, original sin helps explain why countries suffer from creditworthiness problems: it is not due to their incapacity to limit debt accumulation; it is that the 10 The debt to GDP ratio is an even worse predictor. However, it can be argued that public debt is serviced out of the portion GDP that the government can tax. Since tax revenue to GDP ratios are lower in developing countries they should therefore have a lower debt to GDP ratio for the same rating. 11 We use the ratings from Standard and Poor's. We converted the S&P rating into a numerical variable by adopting the following criterion. Selective default = 0, C=2, CC=2.5, CCC= 3, B-=4, and each extra upgrade one point. The maximum is 19 that corresponds to AAA. 11 We test whether the effect of credit rating was due to non-linearities around the investment grade threshold but find no evidence for this hypothesis. 12 These results are robust to alternative definitions of original sin, also as shown in Appendix Table A4 .
structure of that debt makes them risky at low levels of debt that are consistent with a AAA rating in other countries.
Original sin and nominal exchange rate volatility
We will now explore the relationship between the management of monetary and exchange rate policy and the presence of original sin. We posit that countries that suffer from this phenomenon will be less willing to allow their exchange rate to fluctuate. There are no widely accepted indicators of exchange rate flexibility. We will therefore employ three alternative measures to make sure that any results are not excessively dependent on particular definitions. First, we use the de facto classification of Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000) (RESM2), the motivation being that countries that float without regard to the level of the exchange rate should require relatively low levels of reserves, while countries that want to intervene in the exchange rate market need large war chests. Again, we expect a positive correlation. Finally, following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998a,b) we examine the extent to which countries actually use their reserves to intervene in the foreign exchange market, comparing the relative volatility of exchange rate and reserves (RVER). 13 RVER will be high in countries that let their currencies float and low in countries with fixed exchange rates; thus, we anticipate negative correlation with original sin.
In all regressions original sin is measured as the average value for 1993-1998, while all other dependent and explanatory variables are measured as 1992-1999 averages.
We focus on this period because most of our dependent variables are not available after 1999. Table 12 reports regressions using OSIN3 to measure original sin. (The results are robust to using OSIN2, as shown in Appendix Table A2 .) Because OSIN3 captures only one part of the currency composition of the foreign debt (it does not include information on bank loans), its precision depends on how representative bonded debt is in total external liabilities. To take account of this fact, we weigh all observations by the share of securities in total foreign debt.
14 All regressions control for the level of development (LGD_PC, which denotes the log of GDP per capita), the degree of openness (OPEN), and the level of foreign debt (SHARE2, which denotes total debt instruments plus total loans divided by GDP). We do not have much guidance regarding the expected signs of these controls. Although the theory of optimum currency areas suggests that there should be a negative association between exchange rate volatility and openness, previous empirical studies (e.g.
Honkapohja and Pikkareinen 1992, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1997, Eichengreen and
Taylor 2003) have not found much support for this hypothesis. They tend to find that any 13 RVER is equal to the standard deviation of exchange rate depreciation divided by the standard deviation of the reserves over M2 ratio. Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) provide further details on the construction of this index. 14 Formally, the weight is equal to (total debt instruments)/(total bank loans + total debt instruments). In the appendix, we show that the results are robust to dropping the weights.
effect of openness is dominated by the effect of country size; in other words, the empirically relevant corollary of the theory of optimum currency areas is that small countries prefer to peg. The recent literature on fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) suggests that there should be a negative correlation between level of development and desired levels of exchange rate volatility -although it also suggests that less developed countries may sometimes be less successful at limiting volatility in practice.
We of course expect a negative correlation between exchange rate flexibility and share of foreign debt, on the grounds that exchange rate variability will then wreak havoc with debt service costs. This is because the share of foreign debt should amplify the negative effect of original sin. In fact, we do find some evidence that the interaction between original sin and share of foreign debt amplifies the effect of original sin on exchange rate flexibility (the results, however, are not very robust).
As expected, original sin is negatively correlated with exchange rate flexibility.
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The coefficients are always statistically significant when we run regressions using the full sample of countries. In the cases of RVER, the coefficient is not significant (with a p value of approximately 0.19) when we exclude financial centers from the regression.
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The coefficients are also economically important. Column 1, for instance, suggests that complete elimination of original sin is associated with a jump of one point and a half in the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 3-way exchange rate classification.
Countries previously inclined to peg will move to an intermediate regime (to limited flexibility), while countries previously following policies of limited flexibility will be inclined to float. Viewed in this way, original sin provides an explanation for the fear-offloating phenomenon. The fact that original sin is associated with less exchange rate flexibility has the implication that interest rates have to do more of the work when the country is hit by shocks, making monetary policy less accommodating and domestic interest rates more volatile.
18 Prudent borrowers will therefore prefer dollar debts, since the alternative will be riskier (see the Chamon and Hausmann paper presented in chapter 8). Moreover, a volatile interest rate will tend to limit the development of the market in long-term debt.
Original Sin and output and capital-flow volatility
We now explore the correlation between original sin and the volatility of growth and capital flows. There are several reasons for anticipating that the phenomenon will be associated with relatively high levels of volatility. For one thing, original sin limits the scope and effectiveness of countercyclical monetary policies. In addition (as already noted), dollar liabilities limit the ability of central banks to avert liquidity crises in their role as lenders of last resort. Finally, dollar-denominated debts and real exchange rate interact to create uncertainty over the cost of dollar debt service while the associated volatility of domestic interest rates heighten the uncertainties associated with local debt service, thus lowering credit ratings and making capital flows more fickle and volatile (Hausmann, 2003) . Original sin is significantly associated with relatively high levels of output and capital-account volatility. It accounts for a quarter of the difference in output volatility between developed and developing countries; in a horserace between original sin and terms-of-trade volatility, original sin is the only one that remains statistically significant.
It is equally important in explaining capital flow volatility: original sin again explains approximately a quarter of the difference in volatility between developing and OECD countries.
Conclusion
This chapter has developed and utilized a series of numerical indicators of the incidence of original sin. These are designed to capture both its international and domestic dimensions, both bank debts and securitized obligations, and both hedged and unhedged exposures. This is a more comprehensive and informative set of measures than has been available to investigators before. These indicators and the methods we use to construct them should be of interest quite independently of the particular uses to which we put them.
These indicators allow us to establish the importance of original sin for the macroeconomic problems afflicting emerging markets. We show that countries suffering from original sin have found it difficult to participate in the movement toward greater 19 These results are robust to dropping the weights and using alternative measures of original sin, as shown currency flexibility or to exploit its benefits. Because exchange rates movements imbue monetary policy with wealth effects that limit its effectiveness, interest rates must do more of the work when the economy is buffeted by shocks. It follows that interest rates are more volatile and pro-cyclical in such countries, and more volatile interest rates and fragile financial positions imply correspondingly greater macroeconomic volatility.
Output fluctuations are wider in countries with original sin. Capital flows are more volatile and prone to reversal. Countries burdened with original sin have lower credit ratings and hence more tenuous access to international capital markets than even their levels of indebtedness and other creditworthiness indicators would lead one to predict.
Thus, the fact that the external debts of emerging markets are disproportionately denominated in foreign currency goes a long way toward explaining why their economies are more volatile and crisis prone than those of their advanced-country counterparts. A key challenge is thus to identify and distinguish the channels and mechanisms through which inability to borrow in the domestic currency creates this additional volatility. It is this issue that is taken up by the next set of chapters in this volume.
in Appendix Table A3 . The Exchange rate regime is measured using the index developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) averaged over the 1992-1998 period. 1 corresponds to a floating rate and 3 corresponds to a fixed rate. COUNTRY 1993 COUNTRY -1998 COUNTRY 1999 COUNTRY -2001 COUNTRY 1993 COUNTRY -1998 COUNTRY 1999 COUNTRY -2001 COUNTRY 1993 COUNTRY -1998 COUNTRY 1999 COUNTRY -2001 
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